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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state 
to license a marriage between two people of the 
same sex? 
(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state 
to recognize a marriage between two people of 
the same sex when their marriage was lawfully 
licensed and performed out-of-state? 
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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici are scholars of family law and the law of 
equal protection. Amici submit this brief to: (1) draw 
attention to this Court’s precedent unequivocally estab-
lishing that states may not punish children based on 
matters beyond their control and (2) demonstrate 
that state marriage bans inevitably and necessarily 
perform exactly this impermissible function because 
they deprive children of same-sex couples legal, eco-
nomic and social benefits associated with the institu-
tion of marriage. Thus, amici’s analysis, focusing on 
the equal protection rights of children, provides an 
independent basis for evaluating the constitutionality 
of the state marriage bans. Further, amici’s analysis 
is directly responsive to the states’ proffered justifica-
tions for their respective marriage bans. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
“[I]mposing disabilities on the . . . child is con-
trary to the basic concept of our system that 
 
 1 This brief was not authored, in whole or in part, by coun-
sel for either party, and no person other than amici and their 
academic institutions contributed monetarily to the preparation 
or submission of this brief. This amicus brief is filed pursuant to 
a letter of consent from Petitioners’ counsel in all four cases. 
Respondents have filed blanket consents on the docket in all 
four cases. 
2 
legal burdens should bear some relationship 
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.”2 
 The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a 
direction that all persons similarly situated should 
be treated alike.”3 And yet state marriage bans and 
non-recognition bans (hereinafter “marriage bans”) 
patently violate this most fundamental understand-
ing of the equal protection guarantee. The children of 
same-sex couples are identically situated to the chil-
dren of opposite-sex couples in terms of their need 
for and entitlement to the family-supporting rights 
and benefits provided by the institution of marriage. 
By providing these benefits to one group of children 
while denying them to another, state marriage bans 
impose permanent class distinctions between these 
two groups of children, in essence penalizing the chil-
dren of same-sex couples merely because their par-
ents are of the same sex.  
 In a powerful body of precedent, this Court has 
issued a clear prohibition against these types of laws. 
Specifically, this Court has made clear that states 
may not punish children by denying them government-
conferred benefits,4 based on matters beyond their 
 
 2 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (quoting Weber v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)) (alteration in original).  
 3 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 
439 (1985). 
 4 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding state 
law that denied recovery to non-marital child for the wrongful 
death of the child’s mother violated equal protection).  
3 
control, such as moral disapproval of their parents’ 
relationship, or in an effort to affect adult conduct.5 
State marriage bans perform precisely this impermis-
sible function. As demonstrated below, state marriage 
bans punish the children of same-sex couples by de-
nying them the legal, economic and social benefits 
that flow from the institution of marriage, and they 
do so based on concerns completely outside the child’s 
control – for example, in an effort to incentivize adult 
behavior – that is, “[e]ncourag[e] opposite-sex couples 
to enter into a permanent, exclusive relationship.”6 
Punishing children to express a preference for some 
types of families over others, to reflect moral disap-
proval of same-sex relationships, to incentivize oppo-
site-sex adult behavior, or to give effect to private biases 
utterly severs the connection between legal burdens 
and individual responsibility, a core tenet of equal 
protection law.7 Thus, state marriage bans bespeak 
 
 5 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20 (holding that arguments in sup-
port of withholding state benefits to undocumented entrants do not 
apply to children of undocumented entrants because the children 
cannot affect their parents’ conduct or their own status).  
 6 Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 37-38, DeBoer v. Snyder, 
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1341), 2014 WL 1998573, at 
*37 (“Encouraging opposite-sex couples to enter into a perma-
nent, exclusive relationship with which to have and raise 
children – into a marriage – is a legitimate state interest.”). 
 7 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (“[I]mposing disabilities on the 
. . . child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal 
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibil-
ity or wrongdoing.” (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 175)).  
4 
invidious discrimination rather than an effort to at-
tain legitimate governmental objectives.8  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
 This Court’s precedent dealing with the equal 
protection rights of children unequivocally establishes 
that states may not punish children for matters be-
yond their control.9 State marriage bans do precisely 
this. They punish the children of same-sex couples 
 
 8 See Weber, 406 U.S. at 175 (striking down state law de-
nying workers’ compensation proceeds to non-marital children, 
explaining “[t]he status of illegitimacy has expressed through 
the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond 
the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the 
head of an infant is illegal and unjust.”); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-
20 (striking down Texas law that withheld state education funds 
from school districts that enrolled children of Mexican descent 
not legally admitted to the United States, in part, because 
“children can neither affect their parents’ conduct nor their own 
status”); Levy, 391 U.S. at 72 (“We conclude that it is invidious 
to discriminate against [non-marital children] when no action, 
conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm 
that was done the mother.”). 
 9 Catherine Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Same-
Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1589, 1608 (2013) (explaining 
how the government exclusion of children of same-sex couples is 
“the modern-day equivalent” of the exclusion of non-marital chil-
dren); Tanya Washington, In Windsor’s Wake: Section 2 of 
DOMA’s Defense of Marriage at the Expense of Children, 48 IND. 
L. REV. 1, 49-63 (2014) (describing the adverse impact of state 
marriage bans and non-recognition laws on children in same-sex 
families as violating children’s equal protection, substantive due 
process and procedural due process rights). 
5 
because they: (1) foreclose their central legal route to 
family formation; (2) categorically void their legal 
parent-child relationships created incident to out-of-
state marriages; (3) deny them economic rights and 
benefits; and (4) inflict psychological and stigmatic 
harms.  
 
I. THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT UNEQUIVO-
CALLY ESTABLISHES THAT STATES MAY 
NOT PUNISH CHILDREN BASED ON MAT-
TERS BEYOND THEIR CONTROL 
 The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has 
expressed a consistent special concern for discrimina-
tion against children.10 Why? Because discrimination 
against children always necessarily implicates two of 
the Equal Protection Clause’s core values: promoting 
a society in which one’s success or failure is the result 
of individual merit,11 and discouraging the creation of 
 
 10 See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7 (1983) (noting explicitly 
“a special concern for discrimination against non-marital chil-
dren”); San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 111 
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court has a 
“special concern” with education because it is the “ ‘principal in-
strument in awakening the child to cultural values,’ ” preparing 
children for professional training, and helping children adjust to 
the environment (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
493 (1954)). 
 11 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222; see also Susannah W. Pollvogt, 
Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 926 (2012) 
(identifying meritocracy as core equal protection value). 
6 
permanent class or caste distinctions.12 Where laws 
function to place children in a distinct, disadvantaged 
class based on the conduct of their parents or other 
adults, these principles are violated.13 
 Marriage bans contravene these important val-
ues. Indeed, the state defendants in these cases ex-
plicitly concede that marriage is good for children, yet 
state marriage bans categorically exclude an entire 
class of children – the children of same-sex couples – 
from the legal, economic and social benefits of mar-
riage that the states tout. In defending this differen-
tial treatment, the states make clear that marriage 
bans are meant to express and enforce a bare prefer-
ence for families headed by opposite-sex couples over 
families headed by same-sex couples. Even if such a 
bare preference for one social group over another 
were a legitimate state interest (which it likely is 
not), its inescapable corollary – a bare preference for 
the children of opposite-sex couples over the children 
of same-sex couples – cannot be deemed legitimate.  
 
 12 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring); 
see also Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 926 (2012) (discussing goal of Equal 
Protection Clause to eliminate laws that tend to create social 
castes). 
 13 Weber, 406 U.S. at 175 (stating that condemning a child 
for the actions of his parents is “illogical and unjust”); see Levy, 
391 U.S. at 72 (holding that it is invidious to discriminate 
against non-marital children for the actions of their parents over 
which they have no control). 
7 
 Thus, state marriage bans directly invoke this 
Court’s special role in protecting children against 
unfair discrimination – a role the Court has faithfully 
fulfilled on multiple occasions. 
 
A. Discrimination Against Non-Marital Chil-
dren 
 This Court has consistently expressed special 
concern with discrimination against children – in 
particular protecting their right to self-determination 
and to flourish fully in society without being ham-
pered by legal, economic and social barriers imposed 
by virtue of the circumstances of their birth. 
 This concern is perhaps most strongly expressed 
in the Court’s treatment of non-marital children.14 
The United States has a long history of discrimi-
nation against children born to unmarried parents.15 
 
 14 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (stating that 
the status of non-marital children “is, like race or national or-
igin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the con-
trol of the illegitimate individual”); Weber, 406 U.S. at 175; see 
Levy, 391 U.S. at 72. 
 15 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447 (“[R]ights [of 
a non-marital child] are very few, being only such as he can 
acquire; for he can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son 
of nobody.”); Gareth W. Cook, Bastards, 47 TEX. L. REV. 326, 327 
n.11 (1969); Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegiti-
mate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477, 498 (1967); but see Levy, 391 U.S. at 
70 (“We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not 
‘nonpersons.’ They are humans, live, and have their being. They 
are clearly ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
8 
Because of society’s moral condemnation of their par-
ents’ conduct, non-marital children were denied legal 
and social benefits to which marital children were 
entitled.16 They could not inherit property; further, 
they were not entitled to financial parental support, 
wrongful death recovery, workers’ compensation, so-
cial security payments, and other government ben-
efits.17  
 In the early 1940s, criticism of the treatment of 
non-marital children gained traction and eventually 
became a part of the political and legal debates of the 
civil rights movement.18 In 1968, Professor Harry 
Krause and civil rights lawyer Norman Dorsen ad-
vanced child-centered arguments in Levy v. Louisiana, 
 
 16 Amici do not endorse any argument that the adult rela-
tionships or conduct (whether same-sex or opposite-sex) ad-
vanced by states to support state marriage bans are, in fact, 
immoral, irresponsible, or a form of wrongdoing. Amici simply 
argue that the state justifications that advance such arguments 
cannot be deployed to punish children. 
 17 See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma 
and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. 
REV. 345, 346-47 (2011). 
 18 See JUSTINE WISE POLIER, ILLEGITIMACY AND THE LAW 13 
(1944) (NOW Collection, Box 45, Folder 555, on file with the 
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard Univ.); Martha 
Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 
RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 90 (2003); Catherine Smith, Equal Protec-
tion for Children of Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1589, 
1608-15 (2013) (explaining the history of non-marital status 
cases).  
9 
the first equal protection challenge on behalf of non-
marital children.19 
 The facts of the Levy case are compelling. Louise 
Levy, an unmarried black mother with five young 
children, died from the medical malpractice of a 
state hospital.20 Born outside the bounds of marriage, 
the Levy children were excluded by state law from 
a “right to recover” for their mother’s death. Thelma 
Levy, Louise’s sister, sued Louisiana on their behalf.21 
The Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s dismissal of the children’s claim on the 
grounds that they were not “legitimate,” noting that 
such a policy was justified because “ ‘morals and gen-
eral welfare . . . discourage[ ] bringing children into 
the world out of wedlock.’ ”22 In a groundbreaking 
legal victory for children, this Court reversed. This 
Court explained its departure from the practice of 
deferring to legislative decisions, noting, “we have 
 
 19 Brief for Appellee, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) 
(No. 508), 1968 WL 112826. 
 20 Levy, 391 U.S. at 70.  
 21 Id. In the same year as Levy, this Court decided a com-
panion case, Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 
73, 74-76 (1968), striking down a Louisiana law that denied a 
mother wrongful death recovery for her deceased son because he 
was born outside of marriage; but see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 
532, 539-40 (1971) (denying a non-marital child inheritance from 
her father who died without a will). 
 22 Levy, 391 U.S. at 70 (quoting Levy v. Louisiana, 192 So. 2d 
193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1967)). The Louisiana Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari because it found the Court of Appeals made no 
error of law. Levy v. Louisiana, 250 La. 25 (1967). 
10 
been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil 
rights and have not hesitated to strike down an in-
vidious classification even though it had history and 
tradition on its side.”23 This Court determined Louisi-
ana’s actions were a form of invidious discrimination 
driven by the child’s status as “illegitimate” – a status 
that was unrelated to the injury to the mother.24  
 Four years after Levy, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co.,25 this Court struck another blow to 
government conduct that penalized children based on 
moral disdain of the parents’ conduct. In Weber, 
Henry Clyde Stokes died of work-related injuries. 
At the time of his death, he lived with Willie Mae 
Weber.26 Stokes and Weber were not married, but 
were raising five children together.27 One of the chil-
dren was born to Stokes and Weber, while four others 
had been born to Stokes and his lawful wife who had 
previously been committed to a mental hospital.28 
Weber and Stokes’ second child was born shortly after 
Stokes’ death.29 The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld 
a lower court decision disbursing workers’ compen-
sation proceeds to the four marital children while 
 
 23 Levy, 391 U.S. at 71 (internal citations omitted).  
 24 Id. at 72. 
 25 406 U.S. 164 (1972).  
 26 Id. at 165. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
11 
denying such proceeds to the two non-marital chil-
dren.30  
 Once again, this Court reversed and reiterated 
that a state may not place its moral objection of a 
child’s parents’ conduct at the feet of the child by 
withholding government benefits. To do so places the 
child at an economic disadvantage for conduct over 
which the child has no control. This Court explained 
that, while it could not prevent social disapproval of 
children born outside of marriage, it could “strike 
down discriminatory laws relating to the status of 
birth.”31 This Court recognized that “[a]n unacknowl-
edged illegitimate child may suffer as much from the 
loss of a parent as a child born within wedlock or an 
illegitimate later acknowledged.”32  
 From 1968 to 1986, the Supreme Court heard 
more than a dozen cases challenging laws that disad-
vantaged non-marital children, before explicitly hold-
ing that this classification was of such concern that 
differential treatment of non-marital children war-
ranted intermediate scrutiny.33  
 
 
 30 Id. at 167-68. 
 31 Weber, 406 U.S. at 175-76. 
 32 Id. at 169. 
 33 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (holding that 
Pennsylvania statute was unconstitutional under intermediate 
scrutiny). 
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B. Discrimination Against Children in Other 
Contexts 
 This Court has also expressed special concern 
about unfair discrimination against children in other 
contexts. Specifically, Weber’s moral and jurispruden-
tial clarity about discrimination against children was 
echoed years later in Plyler v. Doe.34 At issue in Plyler 
was a state law that sought to deny public education 
to the children of undocumented immigrants. In de-
ciding the case, this Court relied heavily on the 
factual findings of the district court to the effect that: 
(1) the law did nothing to improve the quality of 
education in the state and (2) it instead tended to 
“permanently lock[ ]” the children of undocumented 
immigrants “into the lowest socio-economic class.”35 
 This Court highlighted the foundational mission 
of the Equal Protection Clause: “to work nothing less 
than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious 
class-based legislation.”36 To be sure, not all laws that 
distinguish between groups fall under this prohibi-
tion. But laws that determine the legal, economic and 
social status of children based on the circumstances 
of their birth surely do.  
 As this Court explained in Plyler, “[l]egislation 
imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by 
virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests 
 
 34 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 35 Id. at 208. 
 36 Id. at 213. 
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the kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the Four-
teenth Amendment was designed to abolish.”37 The 
Plyler Court went on to emphasize that, even though 
it was arguably permissible to disapprove of the pres-
ence of undocumented immigrants in the United 
States, it did not justify “imposing disabilities on 
the minor children of ” undocumented immigrants.38 
While “[t]heir parents have the ability to conform 
their conduct to social norms,” the children “can affect 
neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.”39 
This Court further explained, “[e]ven if the State 
found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by 
acting against their children, legislation directing the 
onus of a parent’s misconduct against his children 
does not comport with fundamental conceptions of 
justice.”40 Thus, discrimination against children is un-
just in part because it contravenes “one of the goals of 
the Equal Protection Clause,” which is, “the abolition 
of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable 
 
 37 Id. at 216 n.14 (emphasis added). 
 38 Id. at 219-20.  
 39 Id. at 220 (internal quotation marks omitted). Amici wish 
to stress here that they do not believe that same-sex couples 
should in any way be expected to “conform their conduct to 
social norms” to the extent those norms prefer heterosexual 
relationships. Rather, the point of Plyler and the other child-
centered cases is that it is categorically impermissible to punish 
children based on disapproval of their parents’ status or conduct. 
 40 Id.  
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obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual 
merit.”41 
 Levy, Weber, and Plyler establish that discrim-
ination against children cannot be justified based on 
moral disapproval of their parents’ marital or immi-
gration status. Further, such discrimination cannot 
be justified in an attempt to incentivize adults to 
marry before having sex or to obtain proper immigra-
tion documentation.  
 Marriage bans violate these prohibitions. The 
states recognize the legal, social and economic bene-
fits of marriage, yet seek to deny them to children of 
same-sex couples because of moral disagreement of 
same-sex relationships, to enact a bare preference for 
families headed by a man and a woman, and in an 
attempt to incentivize opposite-sex couples to procre-
ate responsibly within the bounds of marriage. The 
states cannot impose such disabilities on minor chil-
dren without running afoul of well-established equal 
protection law.  
 
C. The Impermissibility of Enforcing Pri-
vate Biases Regarding “Ideal” Family 
Structures  
 Another, related, impermissible justification for 
governmental discrimination in any context is the 
enforcement of private bias. In the seminal case of 
 
 41 Id. at 222. 
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Palmore v. Sidoti,42 the Court took the unusual step of 
reviewing a state family court’s custody award. Fol-
lowing divorce, the mother in the case was awarded 
custody of the couple’s infant child. Both the father 
and the mother were white. Subsequent to the di-
vorce, the mother entered into a relationship with 
and married a black man. The father sought custody 
of the child based on these “changed conditions.”43 The 
family court explicitly found that there was no issue 
with either the mother’s or the stepfather’s parental 
fitness.44 Nonetheless, the court took to heart the 
recommendation of a counselor, who expressed con-
cern about the “social consequences” for a child being 
raised in “an interracial marriage.”45 Specifically, the 
counselor opined: “[T]he wife [petitioner] has chosen 
for herself and for her child, a life-style unacceptable 
to the father and to society. . . . The child . . . is, or at 
school age will be, subject to environmental pressures 
not of choice.”46 
 On this basis, “the [family] court . . . concluded 
that the best interests of the child would be served by 
awarding custody to the father.”47 While acknowledg-
ing that the father’s disapproval of the relationship 
 
 42 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 43 Id. at 430. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 431 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 47 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 431. 
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was not a sufficient basis for awarding him custody, 
the family court determined that, because society did 
not yet fully accept interracial relationships, the child 
would inevitably “suffer from . . . social stigmatiza-
tion.”48 
 This Court acknowledged that the stated interest 
in serving the best interests of the child was “a duty 
of the highest order.”49 However, the Court’s chief con-
cern was in regard to the actual function of the rul-
ing, which gave legal effect to private bias.50 This 
Court held that the family court’s decision, which 
determined the best interests of the child based on 
societal disapproval of the parents, violated equal 
protection, famously stating: “Private biases may be 
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, di-
rectly or indirectly, give them effect.”51 
 Here, marriage bans deny children the legal, eco-
nomic and social benefits of marriage by giving effect 
to private bias in two different ways. First, as de-
tailed above, they give effect to private bias against 
same-sex couples.52 Second, as discussed below, they 
 
 48 Id.  
 49 Id. at 433. 
 50 See id.  
 51 Id. 
 52 The bias reflected in the arguments against same-sex 
marriage range from assumptions about the differences between 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples, such as the biological distinc-
tions in procreation make opposite-sex couples more suitable 
parents, to extremely negative characterizations of gay men, 
(Continued on following page) 
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give effect to private bias based on undisguised 
stereotypes about appropriate gender roles in par-
enting. It is well established that laws may not rely 
on overbroad generalizations about the different 
talents, capacities, or preferences of males and fe-
males.53 Assumptions about expected parenting roles 
that men and women must or should perform based 
on gender alone falls squarely within the gender 
stereotyping that has been deemed impermissible in 
equal protection law, including in decisions about 
parental roles. 
 For example, in Caban v. Mohammed,54 the Court 
struck down a New York law that permitted unwed 
mothers to block the adoption of their children by 
denying consent to potential adoptees, but did not 
grant this consent-based objection to unwed fathers.55 
 
lesbians and bisexuals. For example, in Ohio, marriage ban pro-
ponents explicitly supported their position by arguing that same-
sex relationships exposed the participants to “extreme risks of 
sexually transmitted diseases, physical injuries, mental dis-
orders and even a shortened life span.” Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellees at 20, Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 
2014) (No. 14-3057), 2014 WL 1745560, at *5. 
 53 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); 
see also Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 
721, 731 (2003) (recognizing “pervasive sex-role stereotype that 
caring for family members is women’s work” as an insufficient 
justification under Equal Protection Clause); Orr v. Orr, 440 
U.S. 268, 279-80 (1979) (holding invalid justification based on 
state’s preference for allocation of family responsibilities under 
which wife plays a dependent role).  
 54 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 55 Id. at 384. 
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The father challenged this gender-based distinction 
as an equal protection violation.56 The mother argued 
that the distinction between unwed mothers and un-
wed fathers was based on a fundamental difference 
between the sexes, because “a natural mother, absent 
special circumstances, bears a closer relationship 
with her child” than a father.57 This Court disagreed, 
finding that “maternal and paternal roles are not 
invariably different in importance,” and even if un-
wed mothers were closer to their newborn children, 
“this generalization concerning parent-child relations 
would become less acceptable as the age of the child 
increased.”58 The court “reject[ed] . . . the claim that 
the broad, gender-based distinctions of [the statute] is 
required by any universal difference between mater-
nal and paternal relations at every phase of a child’s 
development.”59 
 In sum, states may not punish children based on 
the status of their birth, regardless of whether the 
state’s aim is to express moral disapproval of adult 
conduct, control or incentivize adult behavior, or give 
effect to private bias about same-sex couples or 
stereotypes about the parenting abilities of men and 
women.  
 
 
 56 Id. at 385. 
 57 Id. at 388. 
 58 Id. at 389. 
 59 Id.  
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II. STATE MARRIAGE BANS HARM CHILDREN 
OF SAME-SEX COUPLES BY DEPRIVING 
THEM OF THE IMPORTANT LEGAL, ECO-
NOMIC, AND SOCIAL BENEFITS OF 
MARRIAGE WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION 
 As demonstrated above, this Court’s precedent 
establishes that states may not punish children for 
matters beyond their control. Matters beyond the 
child’s control include moral disapproval of adult 
conduct, efforts to control or incentivize adult behav-
ior, or practices that give effect to private bias. State 
marriage bans do precisely this. 
 
A. State Marriage Bans Impose Legal, Eco-
nomic and Social Harms on the Chil-
dren of Same-Sex Couples 
 After this Court’s decision in United States v. 
Windsor,60 there is little room for debate on the issue 
of whether marriage bans harm children. This Court 
noted the inevitable psychic harm imposed by the 
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”): 
The differentiation [between same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples] . . . humiliates tens of 
thousands of children now being raised by 
same-sex couples. The law in question makes 
it even more difficult for the children to 
understand the integrity and closeness of 
their own family and its concord with other 
 
 60 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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families in their community and in their 
daily lives.61 
 This Court further noted the financial injury the 
federal marriage ban inflicted on children: 
DOMA . . . brings financial harm to children 
of same-sex couples. It raises the cost of 
health care for families by taxing health ben-
efits provided by employers to their workers’ 
same-sex spouses. And it denies or reduces 
benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a 
spouse and parent, benefits that are an inte-
gral part of family security.62 
 Marriage bans harm children because they: 
(1) foreclose the central legal route to family forma-
tion;63 (2) categorically void existing legal parent-child 
 
 61 Id. at 2694. 
 62 Id. at 2695 (internal citation omitted). 
 63 Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee deny same-sex 
couples other avenues of legal parentage. MICH. COMP. LAWS. 
ANN. § 710.24 (West 2014) (allowing joint adoption by married 
couples); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.03 (West 2014) (allowing 
adoption only by unmarried adult, or, jointly by husband and 
wife); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.470 (West 2014) (allowing 
adoption only by unmarried adult, or, jointly by husband and 
wife). Even if they offered other avenues, the existence of alter-
native forms of legal parentage does not mitigate the claim that 
precluding formation of the parent-child relationship through 
marriage deprives children of one of the most protected forms 
of parentage – parentage incident to an existing marriage. See 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-27 (1989). For a 
detailed description of the limits of alternative parentage see 
Tanya Washington, In Windsor’s Wake: Section 2 of DOMA’s 
(Continued on following page) 
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relationships created incident to out-of-state marriages;64 
(3) deny children of same-sex couples economic rights 
and benefits and other legal protections;65 and (4) in-
flict psychological and stigmatic harm.66 
 
Defense of Marriage at the Expense of Children, 48 IND. L. REV. 
1, 16-26 (2014). 
 64 Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1052 (S.D. Ohio 
2014) (describing the discriminatory impact of Ohio’s non-
recognition law the court observed, “Under Ohio law, if the 
[Plaintiffs’] marriages were accorded respect, both spouses in 
the couple would be entitled to recognition as the parents of 
their expected children. As a matter of statute, Ohio respects the 
parental status of the non-biologically related parent whose 
spouse uses AI to conceive a child born to the married couple. . . . 
However, Defendants refuse to recognize these Plaintiffs’ mar-
riages and the parental presumptions that flow from them, and 
will refuse to issue birth certificates identifying both women in 
these couples as parents of their expected children.”).  
 65 See De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 653 (W.D. Tex. 
2014); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 553 (W.D. Ky. 
2014); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979-80 (S.D. 
Ohio 2013). 
 66 For further explanation of the harms to children, see 
Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children: Justifying Same-
Sex Marriage from the Perspective of a Child of the Union, 102 
W. VA. L. REV. 411, 412 (1999) (“The preponderance of the dia-
logue about same-sex marriage concentrates on the adult part-
ners and their derivative benefits from the relationship; precious 
little focus is given to the rights of a child who may be a product 
of a same-sex relationship.”); Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake of 
All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage 
Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 573, 586 (2005); Courtney 
G. Joslin, Searching for Harm: Same-Sex Marriage and the Well-
Being of Children, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 81, 85-89 (2011); 
Catherine Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Same-Sex 
Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1589, 1595-1608 (2013). 
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1. Family Formation  
 In most jurisdictions, both parties to a hetero-
sexual marriage are presumed to be the legal parent 
of children born into the marriage.67 This marital 
presumption of parentage protects children born into 
opposite-sex marriages by establishing filial relation-
ships with both parents, even if children are not bi-
ologically related to both parents.68 The permanency, 
consistency and stability inherent in the parent-child 
relationship has been recognized by the states as se-
curing children’s best interests in the adoption, cus-
tody, and visitation contexts.69  
 
 67 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124-27 (describing the utility and 
history of the marital parentage presumption). See also OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.03(A)(1) (West 2014) (providing Ohio’s 
codification of the marital parentage presumption); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 406.011 (West 2014) (providing Kentucky’s codifica-
tion of the marital parentage presumption); Family Independ-
ence Agency v. Jefferson, 677 N.W.2d 800, 806 (Mich. 2004) (“The 
presumption that children born or conceived during a marriage 
are the issue of that marriage is deeply rooted in our statutes 
and case law.”).  
 68 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124-27. 
 69 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-401 (West 2014); Armbrister v. 
Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 694-95 (Tenn. 2013); Irvin v. Irvin, 
No. M2011-02424-COA-R3CV, 2012 WL 5993756, at *14, n.9 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2012); Vibbert v. Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d 
292, 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (“We now hold that the appropriate 
test . . . is that the courts must consider a broad array of factors 
in determining whether the visitation is in the child’s best in-
terest. . . .”); Still v. Hayman, 794 N.E.2d 751, 755-56 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2003) (“A strong public policy exists that it is in the child’s 
interest that a parent-child relationship be formed. Moreover, 
(Continued on following page) 
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 While biology provides one of the easiest guaran-
tees of parentage and is often available to at least one 
parent in same-sex couples, same-sex marriage bans 
preclude the marital parentage presumption from 
establishing a filial relationship between children and 
their non-biological same-sex parents.70 Even more 
 
public policy dictates that a parent is responsible to provide for 
the health, maintenance, welfare, and well-being of his child. In 
accordance with these public policies, it can be concluded that 
Ohio favors the establishment of a parent-child relationship 
when it is possible.” (internal citations omitted)); In re Spalding, 
No. 320379, 2014 WL 4628885, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 
2014) (“In deciding whether termination is in the child’s best in-
terests, the court may consider the child’s bond to the parent, 
the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, 
stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over 
the parent’s home.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re 
C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 732 (Tenn. 2005) (“The paramount con-
sideration in child custody cases is the child’s best interests. In 
disputes between legal parents, we determine a child’s best in-
terests in light of the comparative fitness of the parents and 
must take into consideration . . . [t]he stability of the family 
unit of the parents.” (internal citations omitted)); Cummings v. 
Cummings, No. M2003-00086-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2346000, at 
*5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) (noting that “the welfare and 
best interests of the child are the paramount concern in custody, 
visitation, and residential placement determinations,” and “a 
parenting arrangement that best maintains a child’s emotional 
growth, health and stability, and physical care” is an important 
factor in serving the best interests of the child). 
 70 The District Court in DeBoer credited the plaintiffs’ ex-
pert testimony regarding the adverse impact of marriage bans 
on children in same-sex families and observed, “children being 
raised by same-sex couples have only one legal parent and are 
at risk of being placed in ‘legal limbo’ if that parent dies or is 
incapacitated. Denying same-sex couples the ability to marry 
therefore has a manifestly harmful and destabilizing effect on 
(Continued on following page) 
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harmful to children’s best interests are non-
recognition laws, which categorically negate existing 
filial relationships between children and their non-
biological same-sex parents because these laws refuse 
to recognize their parents’ legal out-of-state same-sex 
marriages.71 The effect of exclusionary marriage laws 
is to render these children legal strangers to one of 
their parents in direct contravention of their best 
interests.72  
 Notwithstanding states’ characterization of mar-
riage bans and non-recognition laws as child protec-
tive measures, these laws harm the children they 
purport to protect.73 Children in same-sex families are 
deprived of the permanency, consistency, and stability 
inherent in the parent-child relationship, which has 
been recognized as securing children’s best interests 
in the adoption and custody contexts. 
 
such couples’ children.” DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 
764 (E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 71 Henry, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1054; Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 
553. 
 72 As one judge observed, while questioning the constitu-
tionality of depriving children of the opportunity to have de facto 
parents recognized as legal parents, “[a law] that would deny 
children . . . the opportunity of having their two de facto parents 
become their legal parents, based solely on their biological 
mother’s sexual orientation or marital status, would not only be 
unjust under the circumstances, but also might raise constitu-
tional concerns in light of . . . the best interests of the child.” In 
re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995) (citation omitted).  
 73 DeBoer, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 771. 
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 Since this Court’s decision in United States v. 
Windsor, state and federal courts have acknowledged 
states’ legitimate and compelling interests in pro-
moting children’s welfare and well-being.74 However, 
 
 74 Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (“The Court fails to see 
how having a family could conceivably harm children. Indeed, 
Justice Kennedy explained that it was the government’s failure 
to recognize same-sex marriages that harmed children, not hav-
ing married parents who happened to be of the same sex. . . . 
[T]he Court cannot conceive of any reasons for enacting the laws 
challenged here. Even if one were to conclude that Kentucky’s 
laws do not show animus, they cannot withstand traditional 
rational basis review.”); Henry, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1056 (“[C]hild 
welfare concerns weigh exclusively in favor of recognizing the 
marital rights of same-sex couples.”); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 
456, 476 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Defendants’ essential contention is 
that bans on same-sex marriage promote the welfare of children, 
by encouraging good parenting in stable opposite-sex fami-
lies. . . . Defendants have presented no evidence of any such 
effect.”); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(“Because the Proponents’ arguments are based on overbroad 
generalizations about same-sex parents, and because there is no 
link between banning same-sex marriage and promoting optimal 
childrearing, this aim cannot support the Virginia Marriage 
Laws.”); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 478-80 (E.D. Va. 
2014) (“Of course the welfare of our children is a legitimate state 
interest. However, limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples fails 
to further this interest. . . . [N]eedlessly stigmatizing and hu-
miliating children who are being raised by the loving couples 
targeted by Virginia’s Marriage Laws betrays that interest. . . . 
The ‘for the children rationale’ rests upon an unconstitutional, 
hurtful and unfounded presumption that same-sex couples cannot 
be good parents. . . . The state’s compelling interests in protecting 
and supporting our children are not furthered by a prohibition 
against same-sex marriage.”); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 
1181, 1212 (D. Utah 2014) (“[T]he State fails to demonstrate any 
rational link between its prohibition of same-sex marriage and 
(Continued on following page) 
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many courts, in full view of the harmful impact of 
these laws on children in same-sex families, have 
determined such laws fail even rational basis review 
because they hinder rather than advance child wel-
fare. The District Court in Himes explained:  
Ohio refuses to give legal recognition to both 
parents of these children, based on the 
State’s disapproval of their same-sex re-
lationships. . . . The children in Plaintiffs’ 
and other same-sex married couples’ fam- 
ilies cannot be denied the right to two legal 
 
its goal of having more children raised in the family structure 
the State wishes to promote. . . . [T]he State’s prohibition of 
same-sex marriage detracts from the State’s goal of promoting 
optimal environments for children. The State does not contest 
the Plaintiff ’s assertion that roughly 3,000 children are current-
ly being raised by same-sex couples in Utah. These children are 
also worthy of the State’s protection, yet Amendment 3 harms 
them for the same reasons that the Supreme Court found that 
DOMA harmed the children of same-sex couples.” (internal 
citation omitted)); De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 653 (“There is no 
doubt that the welfare of children is a legitimate state interest; 
however, limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples fails to 
further this interest. Instead, Section 32 causes needless 
stigmatization and humiliation for children being raised by the 
loving same-sex couples being targeted. . . . Defendants have not 
provided any evidentiary support for their assertion that 
denying marriage to same-sex couples positively affects chil-
drearing. Accordingly, this Court agrees with other district 
courts that have recently reviewed this issue and concludes that 
there is no rational connection between Defendants’ assertion 
and the legitimate interest of successful childrearing.”). 
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parents . . . without a sufficient justification. 
No such justification exists.75 
 The states contend that it is best for a child to 
have a relationship to two married parents. If this 
is true, then excluding families headed by same-sex 
couples from marriage thwarts this goal.  
 
2. Economic Harm 
 State marriage bans harm the economic well-
being of the children of same-sex couples even more 
extensively than the economic impact of DOMA de-
scribed in Windsor. Similar to the laws that discrimi-
nated against non-marital children, state marriage 
bans deny children of same-sex couples countless 
rights and benefits that would otherwise flow from a 
legal relationship with their non-biological parent. 
These benefits are designed as a safety net to protect 
children in the event of parental loss or other life 
events, including workers’ compensation benefits, 
state health insurance, civil service benefits, social 
security benefits, inheritance, and wrongful death 
proceeds.76 The lack of a legal relationship between 
 
 75 Henry, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1054-55. 
 76 For a list of benefits, see Catherine Smith, Equal Protec-
tion for Children of Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1589, 1603-07 (2013); Sam Castic, The Irrationality of a Ration-
al Basis: Denying Benefits to the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 
3 MOD. AM. 3, 4-6 (2007); Jennifer L. Rosato, Children of Same-
Sex Parents Deserve the Security Blanket of the Parentage 
Presumption, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 74, 75-76 (2006). 
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the child and her non-biological same-sex parent (as 
well as the parents’ lack of a legally recognized rela-
tionship to one another) also places the child at risk 
in the event that her parents separate or divorce. The 
child may be precluded from recovering child support 
or the benefits of a settled custody arrangement.77 
 The denial of these benefits is not simply a one-
time injury; rather, the exclusion over the course of a 
child’s lifetime is compounding and cumulative, and it 
disrupts one of the primary functions of marriage – to 
provide stability, financial and otherwise, for future 
generations.78 
 
3. Psychological Harm 
 In addition to harms to family formation and 
economic interests, same-sex marriage bans also in-
flict psychological harm by symbolically expressing 
the inferiority of families headed by same-sex couples 
and the children in those families. This Court has 
 
 77 See Smith, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. at 1604-05. 
 78 It is important to recognize that contrary to stereotypes, 
LGBT people raising children may face economic disadvantage. 
Single LGBTs with children are three times more likely than 
non-LGBTs to live near the poverty level, while same-sex 
couples with children are twice as likely as comparable opposite-
sex couples to live near the poverty level. Gary J. Gates, The 
Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, LGBT Parenting in the 
United States, at 1 (Feb. 2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla. 
edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf (last visited March 
2, 2015).  
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previously considered stigma to children as relevant 
in its assessment of the constitutionality of state 
action. Highlighting the adverse psychological effects 
of de jure segregation on black children, for example, 
a unanimous Court announced in Brown v. Board of 
Education:79 
To separate them from others of similar age 
and qualifications solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect 
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone. . . . Segregation of white 
and colored children in public schools has a 
detrimental effect upon the colored children. 
The impact is greater when it has the sanc-
tion of the law, for the policy of separating 
the races is usually interpreted as denoting 
the inferiority of the negro group.80 
This Court has also acknowledged psychic harm to 
undocumented children For example, in Plyler v. 
Doe,81 discussed above, this Court described the effect 
of the law as levying an “inestimable toll . . . on 
the social[,] economic, intellectual, and psychological 
well-being of the individual.”82 The Court went on to 
emphasize the relevance of the law’s harmful impact 
on children, stating: 
 
 79 347 U.S. 483. 
 80 Id. at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 82 Id. at 222. 
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Section 21.031 imposes a lifetime hardship 
on a discrete class of children not account-
able for their disabling status. The stigma of 
illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their 
lives. . . . In determining the rationality of 
§ 21.031, we may appropriately take into ac-
count its costs to the Nation and to the inno-
cent children who are its victims.83 
 The states’ characterization of marriage bans as 
child-protective measures that promote “responsible 
procreation and optimal child-rearing” is at odds with 
the adverse impact of the legislation on all children 
with gay or lesbian parents. The effect of these bans 
is to stigmatize the families of which these children 
are a part, and, by extension, to stigmatize these 
children.84  
 
 83 Id. at 223-24. 
 84 Aff. of Gregory M. Herek, Ph.D. at ¶¶ 29, 30, Mass. v. 
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2012) (No. 1:09-cv-11126-JLT), 2010 WL 604593 (“Denying . . . 
recognition to married same-sex couples devalues and delegiti-
mizes their relationships. It conveys the government’s judgment 
that committed intimate relationships between people of the 
same sex . . . are inferior to heterosexual relationships, and that 
the participants in a same-sex relationship are less deserving of 
society’s recognition than heterosexual couples. . . . To the extent 
that laws differentiate majority and minority groups and accord 
them differing statuses, they highlight the perceived ‘different-
ness’ of the minority and thereby promote and perpetuate 
stigma.”) (“Stigma refers to an enduring condition, status, or 
attribute that is negatively valued by society . . . and that 
consequently disadvantages and disempowers those who have 
it.”). 
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 Children of same-sex couples, like the victims of 
racial segregation and immigrant children excluded 
from educational opportunities, suffer the harmful 
psychological effects of the condemnation of their 
families, which, as the Court noted in Brown, is com-
pounded by the law’s sanction of this discrimination.85  
 Significantly, this Court in Windsor acknowl-
edged the stigmatic harm DOMA inflicted on children 
and explained:  
[I]t humiliates tens of thousands of children 
now being raised by same-sex couples. The 
law in question makes it even more difficult 
for the children to understand the integrity 
and closeness of their own family and its 
concord with other families in their commu-
nity and in their daily lives . . . DOMA in-
structs all federal officials, and indeed all 
persons with whom same-sex couples inter-
act, including their own children, that their 
marriage is less worthy than the marriages 
of others.86 
 State law, as the loci of family law, inflicts an 
even greater psychological and stigmatic harm than 
 
 85 It is important to note that many children are at the 
intersections of these categories. Half of the children under 18 
who live with same-sex couples are children of color. Gary J. 
Gates, The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, LGBT Par-
enting in the United States, at 1 (Feb. 2013), http://williamsinstitute. 
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf (last visited 
March 2, 2015). 
 86 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694-96. 
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DOMA on the children with gay and lesbian parents. 
Brown, Plyler and Windsor make it clear that the 
stigma a discriminatory law imposes – particularly 
on children – is a worthy consideration when analyz-
ing the constitutionality of that law. The marriage 
bans send a direct message to children of gay and 
lesbian parents that their families are inferior and 
less worthy of legal recognition. 
 
B. The States’ Justifications for Imposing 
these Discriminatory Harms are Patently 
Impermissible 
 As demonstrated above, this Court’s precedent 
establishes that states may not punish children for 
matters beyond their control. Matters beyond the 
child’s control include moral disapproval of adult 
conduct, efforts to control or incentivize adult behav-
ior, or practices that give effect to private bias. State 
marriage bans do precisely this. 
 The justifications offered by the states in defense 
of their respective marriage bans fall squarely within 
this prohibited category of government action. In ar-
guing before the Sixth Circuit, the various states 
involved in this case presented a limited number of 
justifications for their marriage bans. Several of 
the states advance the “responsible procreation ar-
gument,” which contends that state marriage bans 
“[e]ncourage[ ] opposite-sex couples to enter into a 
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permanent, exclusive relationship within which to 
have and raise children”87 or “encourage . . . sexual 
interactions [between a man and a woman] to occur 
in long-term, committed relationships, so that the 
resulting children will be raised by both their mom 
and their dad.”88 This is a naked attempt to incentiv-
ize adult behavior at the cost of children’s welfare, 
and is not permitted under the body of law discussed 
above. 
 The states further contend that the marriage 
bans reflect a belief “that children benefit from being 
raised by both a mother and a father” because “[m]en 
and women are different, and having both a man and 
a woman as part of the parenting team could reason-
ably be thought to be a good idea.”89 This justification 
reflects a bare preference for certain families over 
others, bias against same-sex couples and gender 
stereotyping. Similarly, the contention that states 
 
 87 Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 37, DeBoer v. Snyder, 
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1341), 2014 WL 1998573, at 
*38. 
 88 Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 63, DeBoer v. Snyder, 
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1341), 2014 WL 1998573, at 
*52. See also Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 34, Tanco v. 
Haslam, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-5297), 2014 WL 
1998675, at *26 (promoting “a ‘responsible procreation’ theory 
that justifies conferring the inducements of marital recognition 
and benefits on opposite-sex couples, who can otherwise produce 
children by accident, but not on same-sex couples, who cannot”). 
 89 Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 51, DeBoer v. Snyder, 
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1341), 2014 WL 1998573, at 
*40. 
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may “promote marriage in the setting where children 
naturally (biologically) come from – the union of a 
man and a woman”90 seeks to enforce a bare prefer-
ence for so-called “biological” families. 
 Thus, the states concede that their marriage 
bans represent an effort to incentivize adult behavior 
(“encouraging” adults in opposite-sex couples to enter 
the institution of marriage and to procreate only 
within that institution) as well as a bare preference 
for families headed by opposite-sex couples and/or 
families formed “biologically” or “naturally.” Even if 
these were legitimate state interests standing alone, 
they are – per precedent and fundamental notions of 
fairness – impermissible bases for imposing harms on 
the children of same-sex couples. Further, it does not 
take much imagination to see that the preference for 
families headed by opposite-sex couples sounds in 
private bias against and moral disapproval of same-
sex couples. 
 As demonstrated above, none of these justifica-
tions is a permissible basis for imposing discrimina-
tory harms on children.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
   
 
 90 Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 63, DeBoer v. Snyder, 
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1341), 2014 WL 1998573, at 
*52. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals should be reversed. 
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